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4 March 2024

Paulo Henrique de Lima Santana: Bits from FOSDEM 2023 and 2024

Link para vers o em portugu s

Intro Since 2019, I have traveled to Brussels at the beginning of the year to join FOSDEM, considered the largest and most important Free Software event in Europe. The 2024 edition was the fourth in-person edition in a row that I joined (2021 and 2022 did not happen due to COVID-19) and always with the financial help of Debian, which kindly paid my flight tickets after receiving my request asking for help to travel and approved by the Debian leader. In 2020 I wrote several posts with a very complete report of the days I spent in Brussels. But in 2023 I didn t write anything, and becayse last year and this year I coordinated a room dedicated to translations of Free Software and Open Source projects, I m going to take the opportunity to write about these two years and how it was my experience. After my first trip to FOSDEM, I started to think that I could join in a more active way than just a regular attendee, so I had the desire to propose a talk to one of the rooms. But then I thought that instead of proposing a tal, I could organize a room for talks :-) and with the topic translations which is something that I m very interested in, because it s been a few years since I ve been helping to translate the Debian for Portuguese.

Joining FOSDEM 2023 In the second half of 2022 I did some research and saw that there had never been a room dedicated to translations, so when the FOSDEM organization opened the call to receive room proposals (called DevRoom) for the 2023 edition, I sent a proposal to a translation room and it was accepted! After the room was confirmed, the next step was for me, as room coordinator, to publicize the call for talk proposals. I spent a few weeks hoping to find out if I would receive a good number of proposals or if it would be a failure. But to my happiness, I received eight proposals and I had to select six to schedule the room programming schedule due to time constraints . FOSDEM 2023 took place from February 4th to 5th and the translation devroom was scheduled on the second day in the afternoon. Fosdem 2023 The talks held in the room were these below, and in each of them you can watch the recording video. And on the first day of FOSDEM I was at the Debian stand selling the t-shirts that I had taken from Brazil. People from France were also there selling other products and it was cool to interact with people who visited the booth to buy and/or talk about Debian.
Fosdem 2023

Fosdem 2023
Photos

Joining FOSDEM 2024 The 2023 result motivated me to propose the translation devroom again when the FOSDEM 2024 organization opened the call for rooms . I was waiting to find out if the FOSDEM organization would accept a room on this topic for the second year in a row and to my delight, my proposal was accepted again :-) This time I received 11 proposals! And again due to time constraints, I had to select six to schedule the room schedule grid. FOSDEM 2024 took place from February 3rd to 4th and the translation devroom was scheduled for the second day again, but this time in the morning. The talks held in the room were these below, and in each of them you can watch the recording video. This time I didn t help at the Debian stand because I couldn t bring t-shirts to sell from Brazil. So I just stopped by and talked to some people who were there like some DDs. But I volunteered for a few hours to operate the streaming camera in one of the main rooms.
Fosdem 2024

Fosdem 2024
Photos

Conclusion The topics of the talks in these two years were quite diverse, and all the lectures were really very good. In the 12 talks we can see how translations happen in some projects such as KDE, PostgreSQL, Debian and Mattermost. We had the presentation of tools such as LibreTranslate, Weblate, scripts, AI, data model. And also reports on the work carried out by communities in Africa, China and Indonesia. The rooms were full for some talks, a little more empty for others, but I was very satisfied with the final result of these two years. I leave my special thanks to Jonathan Carter, Debian Leader who approved my flight tickets requests so that I could join FOSDEM 2023 and 2024. This help was essential to make my trip to Brussels because flight tickets are not cheap at all. I would also like to thank my wife Jandira, who has been my travel partner :-) Bruxelas As there has been an increase in the number of proposals received, I believe that interest in the translations devroom is growing. So I intend to send the devroom proposal to FOSDEM 2025, and if it is accepted, wait for the future Debian Leader to approve helping me with the flight tickets again. We ll see.

3 March 2024

Petter Reinholdtsen: RAID status from LSI Megaraid controllers using free software

The last few days I have revisited RAID setup using the LSI Megaraid controller. These are a family of controllers called PERC by Dell, and is present in several old PowerEdge servers, and I recently got my hands on one of these. I had forgotten how to handle this RAID controller in Debian, so I had to take a peek in the Debian wiki page "Linux and Hardware RAID: an administrator's summary" to remember what kind of software is available to configure and monitor the disks and controller. I prefer Free Software alternatives to proprietary tools, as the later tend to fall into disarray once the manufacturer loose interest, and often do not work with newer Linux Distributions. Sadly there is no free software tool to configure the RAID setup, only to monitor it. RAID can provide improved reliability and resilience in a storage solution, but only if it is being regularly checked and any broken disks are being replaced in time. I thus want to ensure some automatic monitoring is available. In the discovery process, I came across a old free software tool to monitor PERC2, PERC3, PERC4 and PERC5 controllers, which to my surprise is not present in debian. To help change that I created a request for packaging of the megactl package, and tried to track down a usable version. The original project site is on Sourceforge, but as far as I can tell that project has been dead for more than 15 years. I managed to find a more recent fork on github from user hmage, but it is unclear to me if this is still being maintained. It has not seen much improvements since 2016. A more up to date edition is a git fork from the original github fork by user namiltd, and this newer fork seem a lot more promising. The owner of this github repository has replied to change proposals within hours, and had already added some improvements and support for more hardware. Sadly he is reluctant to commit to maintaining the tool and stated in my first pull request that he think a new release should be made based on the git repository owned by hmage. I perfectly understand this reluctance, as I feel the same about maintaining yet another package in Debian when I barely have time to take care of the ones I already maintain, but do not really have high hopes that hmage will have time to spend on it and hope namiltd will change his mind. In any case, I created a draft package based on the namiltd edition and put it under the debian group on salsa.debian.org. If you own a Dell PowerEdge server with one of the PERC controllers, or any other RAID controller using the megaraid or megaraid_sas Linux kernel modules, you might want to check it out. If enough people are interested, perhaps the package will make it into the Debian archive. There are two tools provided, megactl for the megaraid Linux kernel module, and megasasctl for the megaraid_sas Linux kernel module. The simple output from the command on one of my machines look like this (yes, I know some of the disks have problems. :). 
# megasasctl 
a0       PERC H730 Mini           encl:1 ldrv:2  batt:good
a0d0       558GiB RAID 1   1x2  optimal
a0d1      3067GiB RAID 0   1x11 optimal
a0e32s0     558GiB  a0d0  online   errs: media:0  other:19
a0e32s1     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s2     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s3     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s4     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s5     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s6     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s8     558GiB  a0d0  online   errs: media:0  other:17
a0e32s9     279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s10    279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s11    279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s12    279GiB  a0d1  online  
a0e32s13    279GiB  a0d1  online  
#
In addition to displaying a simple status report, it can also test individual drives and print the various event logs. Perhaps you too find it useful? In the packaging process I provided some patches upstream to improve installation and ensure a Appstream metainfo file is provided to list all supported HW, to allow isenkram to propose the package on all servers with a relevant PCI card. As usual, if you use Bitcoin and want to show your support of my activities, please send Bitcoin donations to my address 15oWEoG9dUPovwmUL9KWAnYRtNJEkP1u1b.

28 February 2024

Daniel Lange: Opencollective shutting down

Update 28.02.2024 19:45 CET: There is now a blog entry at https://blog.opencollective.com/open-collective-official-statement-ocf-dissolution/ trying to discern the legal entities in the Open Collective ecosystem and recommending potential ways forward.
Gee, there is nothing on their blog yet, but I just [28.02.2023 00:07 CET] received this email from Mike Strode, Program Officer at the Open Collective Foundation: Dear Daniel Lange, It is with a heavy heart that I'm writing today to inform you that the Board of Directors of the Open Collective Foundation (OCF) has made the difficult decision to dissolve OCF, effective December 31, 2024. We are proud of the work we have been able to do together. We have been honored to build community with you and the hundreds of other collectives hosted at the Open Collective Foundation. What you need to know: We are beginning a staged dissolution process that will allow our over 600 collectives the time to close or transition their work. Dissolving OCF will take many months, and involves settling all liabilities while spending down all funds in a legally compliant manner. Our priority is to support our collectives in navigating this change. We want to provide collectives the longest possible runway to wind down or transition their operations while we focus on the many legal and financial tasks associated with dissolving a nonprofit. March 15 is the last day to accept donations. You will have until September 30 to work with us to develop and implement a plan to spend down the money in your fund. Key dates are included at the bottom of this email. We know this is going to be difficult, and we will do everything we can to ease the transition for you. How we will support collectives: It remains our fiduciary responsibility to safeguard each collective's charitable assets and ensure funds are used solely for specified charitable purposes. We will be providing assistance and support to you, whether you choose to spend out and close down your collective or continue your work through another 501(c)(3) organization or fiscal sponsor. Unfortunately, we had to say goodbye to several of our colleagues today as we pare down our core staff to reduce costs. I will be staying on staff to support collectives through this transition, along with Wayne Kleppe, our Finance Administrator. What led to this decision: From day one, OCF was committed to experimentation and innovation. We were dedicated to finding new ways to open up the nonprofit space, making it easier for people to raise and access funding so they can do good in their communities. OCF was created by Open Collective Inc. (OCI), a company formed in 2015 with the goal of "enabling groups to quickly set up a collective, raise funds and manage them transparently." Soon after being founded by OCI, OCF went through a period of rapid growth. We responded to increased demand arising from the COVID-19 pandemic without taking the time to establish the appropriate systems and infrastructure to sustain that growth. Unfortunately, over the past year, we have learned that Open Collective Foundation's business model is not sustainable with the number of complex services we have offered and the fees we pay to the Open Collective Inc. tech platform. In late 2023, we made the decision to pause accepting new collectives in order to create space for us to address the issues. Unfortunately, it became clear that it would not be financially feasible to make the necessary corrections, and we determined that OCF is not viable. What's next: We know this news will raise questions for many of our collectives. We will be making space for questions and reactions in the coming weeks. In the meantime, we have developed this FAQ which we will keep updated as more questions come in. What you need to do next: Dates to know: In Care & Accompaniment,
Mike Strode
Program Officer
Open Collective Foundation Our mailing address has changed! We are now located at 440 N. Barranca Avenue #3717, Covina, CA 91723, USA

17 February 2024

James Valleroy: snac2: a minimalist ActivityPub server in Debian

snac2, currently available in Debian testing and unstable, is described by its upstream as A simple, minimalistic ActivityPub instance written in portable C. It provides an ActivityPub server with a bare-bones web interface. It does not use JavaScript or require a database.
Basic forms for creating a new post, or following someone
ActivityPub is the protocol for federated social networks that is implemented by Mastodon, Pleroma, and other similar server software. Federated social networks are most often used for micro-blogging , or making many small posts. You can decide to follow another user (or bot) to see their posts, even if they happen to be on a different server (as long as the server software is compatible with the ActivityPub standard).
The timeline shows posts from accounts that you follow
In addition, snac2 has preliminary support for the Mastodon Client API. This allows basic support for mobile apps that support Mastodon, but you should expect that many features are not available yet. If you are interested in running a minimalist ActivityPub server on Debian, please try out snac2, and report any bugs that you find.

13 February 2024

Matthew Palmer: Not all TLDs are Created Equal

In light of the recent cancellation of the queer.af domain registration by the Taliban, the fragile and difficult nature of country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs) has once again been comprehensively demonstrated. Since many people may not be aware of the risks, I thought I d give a solid explainer of the whole situation, and explain why you should, in general, not have anything to do with domains which are registered under ccTLDs.

Top-level What-Now? A top-level domain (TLD) is the last part of a domain name (the collection of words, separated by periods, after the https:// in your web browser s location bar). It s the com in example.com, or the af in queer.af. There are two kinds of TLDs: country-code TLDs (ccTLDs) and generic TLDs (gTLDs). Despite all being TLDs, they re very different beasts under the hood.

What s the Difference? Generic TLDs are what most organisations and individuals register their domains under: old-school technobabble like com , net , or org , historical oddities like gov , and the new-fangled world of words like tech , social , and bank . These gTLDs are all regulated under a set of rules created and administered by ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ), which try to ensure that things aren t a complete wild-west, limiting things like price hikes (well, sometimes, anyway), and providing means for disputes over names1. Country-code TLDs, in contrast, are all two letters long2, and are given out to countries to do with as they please. While ICANN kinda-sorta has something to do with ccTLDs (in the sense that it makes them exist on the Internet), it has no authority to control how a ccTLD is managed. If a country decides to raise prices by 100x, or cancel all registrations that were made on the 12th of the month, there s nothing anyone can do about it. If that sounds bad, that s because it is. Also, it s not a theoretical problem the Taliban deciding to asssert its bigotry over the little corner of the Internet namespace it has taken control of is far from the first time that ccTLDs have caused grief.

Shifting Sands The queer.af cancellation is interesting because, at the time the domain was reportedly registered, 2018, Afghanistan had what one might describe as, at least, a different political climate. Since then, of course, things have changed, and the new bosses have decided to get a bit more active. Those running queer.af seem to have seen the writing on the wall, and were planning on moving to another, less fraught, domain, but hadn t completed that move when the Taliban came knocking.

The Curious Case of Brexit When the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union, it fell foul of the EU s rules for the registration of domains under the eu ccTLD3. To register (and maintain) a domain name ending in .eu, you have to be a resident of the EU. When the UK ceased to be part of the EU, residents of the UK were no longer EU residents. Cue much unhappiness, wailing, and gnashing of teeth when this was pointed out to Britons. Some decided to give up their domains, and move to other parts of the Internet, while others managed to hold onto them by various legal sleight-of-hand (like having an EU company maintain the registration on their behalf). In any event, all very unpleasant for everyone involved.

Geopolitics on the Internet?!? After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukranian Vice Prime Minister asked ICANN to suspend ccTLDs associated with Russia. While ICANN said that it wasn t going to do that, because it wouldn t do anything useful, some domain registrars (the companies you pay to register domain names) ceased to deal in Russian ccTLDs, and some websites restricted links to domains with Russian ccTLDs. Whether or not you agree with the sort of activism implied by these actions, the fact remains that even the actions of a government that aren t directly related to the Internet can have grave consequences for your domain name if it s registered under a ccTLD. I don t think any gTLD operator will be invading a neighbouring country any time soon.

Money, Money, Money, Must Be Funny When you register a domain name, you pay a registration fee to a registrar, who does administrative gubbins and causes you to be able to control the domain name in the DNS. However, you don t own that domain name4 you re only renting it. When the registration period comes to an end, you have to renew the domain name, or you ll cease to be able to control it. Given that a domain name is typically your brand or identity online, the chances are you d prefer to keep it over time, because moving to a new domain name is a massive pain, having to tell all your customers or users that now you re somewhere else, plus having to accept the risk of someone registering the domain name you used to have and capturing your traffic it s all a gigantic hassle. For gTLDs, ICANN has various rules around price increases and bait-and-switch pricing that tries to keep a lid on the worst excesses of registries. While there are any number of reasonable criticisms of the rules, and the Internet community has to stay on their toes to keep ICANN from totally succumbing to regulatory capture, at least in the gTLD space there s some degree of control over price gouging. On the other hand, ccTLDs have no effective controls over their pricing. For example, in 2008 the Seychelles increased the price of .sc domain names from US$25 to US$75. No reason, no warning, just pay up .

Who Is Even Getting That Money? A closely related concern about ccTLDs is that some of the cool ones are assigned to countries that are not great. The poster child for this is almost certainly Libya, which has the ccTLD ly . While Libya was being run by a terrorist-supporting extremist, companies thought it was a great idea to have domain names that ended in .ly. These domain registrations weren t (and aren t) cheap, and it s hard to imagine that at least some of that money wasn t going to benefit the Gaddafi regime. Similarly, the British Indian Ocean Territory, which has the io ccTLD, was created in a colonialist piece of chicanery that expelled thousands of native Chagossians from Diego Garcia. Money from the registration of .io domains doesn t go to the (former) residents of the Chagos islands, instead it gets paid to the UK government. Again, I m not trying to suggest that all gTLD operators are wonderful people, but it s not particularly likely that the direct beneficiaries of the operation of a gTLD stole an island chain and evicted the residents.

Are ccTLDs Ever Useful? The answer to that question is an unqualified maybe . I certainly don t think it s a good idea to register a domain under a ccTLD for vanity purposes: because it makes a word, is the same as a file extension you like, or because it looks cool. Those ccTLDs that clearly represent and are associated with a particular country are more likely to be OK, because there is less impetus for the registry to try a naked cash grab. Unfortunately, ccTLD registries have a disconcerting habit of changing their minds on whether they serve their geographic locality, such as when auDA decided to declare an open season in the .au namespace some years ago. Essentially, while a ccTLD may have geographic connotations now, there s not a lot of guarantee that they won t fall victim to scope creep in the future. Finally, it might be somewhat safer to register under a ccTLD if you live in the location involved. At least then you might have a better idea of whether your domain is likely to get pulled out from underneath you. Unfortunately, as the .eu example shows, living somewhere today is no guarantee you ll still be living there tomorrow, even if you don t move house. In short, I d suggest sticking to gTLDs. They re at least lower risk than ccTLDs.

+1, Helpful If you ve found this post informative, why not buy me a refreshing beverage? My typing fingers (both of them) thank you in advance for your generosity.

Footnotes
  1. don t make the mistake of thinking that I approve of ICANN or how it operates; it s an omnishambles of poor governance and incomprehensible decision-making.
  2. corresponding roughly, though not precisely (because everything has to be complicated, because humans are complicated), to the entries in the ISO standard for Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions , ISO 3166.
  3. yes, the EU is not a country; it s part of the roughly, though not precisely caveat mentioned previously.
  4. despite what domain registrars try very hard to imply, without falling foul of deceptive advertising regulations.

12 February 2024

Freexian Collaborators: Monthly report about Debian Long Term Support, January 2024 (by Roberto C. S nchez)

Like each month, have a look at the work funded by Freexian s Debian LTS offering.

Debian LTS contributors In January, 16 contributors have been paid to work on Debian LTS, their reports are available:
  • Abhijith PA did 14.0h (out of 7.0h assigned and 7.0h from previous period).
  • Bastien Roucari s did 22.0h (out of 16.0h assigned and 6.0h from previous period).
  • Ben Hutchings did 14.5h (out of 8.0h assigned and 16.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 9.5h to the next month.
  • Chris Lamb did 18.0h (out of 18.0h assigned).
  • Daniel Leidert did 10.0h (out of 10.0h assigned).
  • Emilio Pozuelo Monfort did 10.0h (out of 14.75h assigned and 27.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 31.75h to the next month.
  • Guilhem Moulin did 9.75h (out of 25.0h assigned), thus carrying over 15.25h to the next month.
  • Holger Levsen did 3.5h (out of 12.0h assigned), thus carrying over 8.5h to the next month.
  • Markus Koschany did 40.0h (out of 40.0h assigned).
  • Roberto C. S nchez did 8.75h (out of 9.5h assigned and 2.5h from previous period), thus carrying over 3.25h to the next month.
  • Santiago Ruano Rinc n did 13.5h (out of 8.25h assigned and 7.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 2.5h to the next month.
  • Sean Whitton did 0.5h (out of 0.25h assigned and 5.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 5.5h to the next month.
  • Sylvain Beucler did 9.5h (out of 23.25h assigned and 18.5h from previous period), thus carrying over 32.25h to the next month.
  • Thorsten Alteholz did 14.0h (out of 14.0h assigned).
  • Tobias Frost did 12.0h (out of 10.25h assigned and 1.75h from previous period).
  • Utkarsh Gupta did 8.5h (out of 35.75h assigned), thus carrying over 24.75h to the next month.

Evolution of the situation In January, we have released 25 DLAs. A variety of particularly notable packages were updated during January. Among those updates were the Linux kernel (both versions 5.10 and 4.19), mariadb-10.3, openjdk-11, firefox-esr, and thunderbird. In addition to the many other LTS package updates which were released in January, LTS contributors continue their efforts to make impactful contributions both within the Debian community.

Thanks to our sponsors Sponsors that joined recently are in bold.

7 February 2024

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in January 2024

Welcome to the January 2024 report from the Reproducible Builds project. In these reports we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. If you are interested in contributing to the project, please visit our Contribute page on our website.

How we executed a critical supply chain attack on PyTorch John Stawinski and Adnan Khan published a lengthy blog post detailing how they executed a supply-chain attack against PyTorch, a popular machine learning platform used by titans like Google, Meta, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin :
Our exploit path resulted in the ability to upload malicious PyTorch releases to GitHub, upload releases to [Amazon Web Services], potentially add code to the main repository branch, backdoor PyTorch dependencies the list goes on. In short, it was bad. Quite bad.
The attack pivoted on PyTorch s use of self-hosted runners as well as submitting a pull request to address a trivial typo in the project s README file to gain access to repository secrets and API keys that could subsequently be used for malicious purposes.

New Arch Linux forensic filesystem tool On our mailing list this month, long-time Reproducible Builds developer kpcyrd announced a new tool designed to forensically analyse Arch Linux filesystem images. Called archlinux-userland-fs-cmp, the tool is supposed to be used from a rescue image (any Linux) with an Arch install mounted to, [for example], /mnt. Crucially, however, at no point is any file from the mounted filesystem eval d or otherwise executed. Parsers are written in a memory safe language. More information about the tool can be found on their announcement message, as well as on the tool s homepage. A GIF of the tool in action is also available.

Issues with our SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH code? Chris Lamb started a thread on our mailing list summarising some potential problems with the source code snippet the Reproducible Builds project has been using to parse the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH environment variable:
I m not 100% sure who originally wrote this code, but it was probably sometime in the ~2015 era, and it must be in a huge number of codebases by now. Anyway, Alejandro Colomar was working on the shadow security tool and pinged me regarding some potential issues with the code. You can see this conversation here.
Chris ends his message with a request that those with intimate or low-level knowledge of time_t, C types, overflows and the various parsing libraries in the C standard library (etc.) contribute with further info.

Distribution updates In Debian this month, Roland Clobus posted another detailed update of the status of reproducible ISO images on our mailing list. In particular, Roland helpfully summarised that all major desktops build reproducibly with bullseye, bookworm, trixie and sid provided they are built for a second time within the same DAK run (i.e. [within] 6 hours) . Additionally 7 of the 8 bookworm images from the official download link build reproducibly at any later time. In addition to this, three reviews of Debian packages were added, 17 were updated and 15 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Elsewhere, Bernhard posted another monthly update for his work elsewhere in openSUSE.

Community updates There were made a number of improvements to our website, including Bernhard M. Wiedemann fixing a number of typos of the term nondeterministic . [ ] and Jan Zerebecki adding a substantial and highly welcome section to our page about SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH to document its interaction with distribution rebuilds. [ ].
diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made a number of changes such as uploading versions 254 and 255 to Debian but focusing on triaging and/or merging code from other contributors. This included adding support for comparing eXtensible ARchive (.XAR/.PKG) files courtesy of Seth Michael Larson [ ][ ], as well considerable work from Vekhir in order to fix compatibility between various and subtle incompatible versions of the progressbar libraries in Python [ ][ ][ ][ ]. Thanks!

Reproducibility testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework (available at tests.reproducible-builds.org) in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In January, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen:
  • Debian-related changes:
    • Reduce the number of arm64 architecture workers from 24 to 16. [ ]
    • Use diffoscope from the Debian release being tested again. [ ]
    • Improve the handling when killing unwanted processes [ ][ ][ ] and be more verbose about it, too [ ].
    • Don t mark a job as failed if process marked as to-be-killed is already gone. [ ]
    • Display the architecture of builds that have been running for more than 48 hours. [ ]
    • Reboot arm64 nodes when they hit an OOM (out of memory) state. [ ]
  • Package rescheduling changes:
    • Reduce IRC notifications to 1 when rescheduling due to package status changes. [ ]
    • Correctly set SUDO_USER when rescheduling packages. [ ]
    • Automatically reschedule packages regressing to FTBFS (build failure) or FTBR (build success, but unreproducible). [ ]
  • OpenWrt-related changes:
    • Install the python3-dev and python3-pyelftools packages as they are now needed for the sunxi target. [ ][ ]
    • Also install the libpam0g-dev which is needed by some OpenWrt hardware targets. [ ]
  • Misc:
    • As it s January, set the real_year variable to 2024 [ ] and bump various copyright years as well [ ].
    • Fix a large (!) number of spelling mistakes in various scripts. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Prevent Squid and Systemd processes from being killed by the kernel s OOM killer. [ ]
    • Install the iptables tool everywhere, else our custom rc.local script fails. [ ]
    • Cleanup the /srv/workspace/pbuilder directory on boot. [ ]
    • Automatically restart Squid if it fails. [ ]
    • Limit the execution of chroot-installation jobs to a maximum of 4 concurrent runs. [ ][ ]
Significant amounts of node maintenance was performed by Holger Levsen (eg. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] etc.) and Vagrant Cascadian (eg. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]). Indeed, Vagrant Cascadian handled an extended power outage for the network running the Debian armhf architecture test infrastructure. This provided the incentive to replace the UPS batteries and consolidate infrastructure to reduce future UPS load. [ ] Elsewhere in our infrastructure, however, Holger Levsen also adjusted the email configuration for @reproducible-builds.org to deal with a new SMTP email attack. [ ]

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project tries to detects, dissects and fix as many (currently) unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including: Separate to this, Vagrant Cascadian followed up with the relevant maintainers when reproducibility fixes were not included in newly-uploaded versions of the mm-common package in Debian this was quickly fixed, however. [ ]
If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

31 January 2024

Valhalla's Things: Macrame Bookbag

Posted on January 31, 2024
Tags: madeof:atoms, craft:macrame
a macrame bag in ~3 mm ecru yarn, with very irregular knots of different types, holding a book with a blue cover. The bottom part has a rigid single layer triangle and a fringe. In late 2022 I prepared a batch of drawstring backpacks in cotton as reusable wrappers for Christmas gifts; however I didn t know what cord to use, didn t want to use paracord, and couldn t find anything that looked right in the local shops. With Christmas getting dangerously closer, I visited a craft materials website for unrelated reasons, found out that they sold macrame cords, and panic-bought a few types in the hope that at least one would work for the backpacks. I got lucky, and my first choice fitted just fine, and I was able to finish the backpacks in time for the holidays. And then I had a box full of macrame cords in various sizes and types that weren t the best match for the drawstring in a backpack, and no real use for them. I don t think I had ever done macrame, but I have made friendship bracelets in primary school, and a few Friendship Bracelets, But For Real Men So We Call Them Survival Bracelets(TM) more recently, so I didn t bother reading instructions or tutorials online, I just grabbed the Ashley Book of Knots to refresh myself on the knots used, and decided to make myself a small bag for an A6 book. I choose one of the thin, ~3 mm cords, Tre Sfere Macram Barbante, of which there was plenty, so that I could stumble around with no real plan. A loop of four cords, with a handle made of square knots that keeps it together. I started by looping 5 m of cord, making iirc 2 rounds of a loop about the right size to go around the book with a bit of ease, then used the ends as filler cords for a handle, wrapped them around the loop and worked square knots all over them to make a handle. Then I cut the rest of the cord into 40 pieces, each 4 m long, because I had no idea how much I was going to need (spoiler: I successfully got it wrong :D ) I joined the cords to the handle with lark head knots, 20 per side, and then I started knotting without a plan or anything, alternating between hitches and square knots, sometimes close together and sometimes leaving some free cord between them. And apparently I also completely forgot to take in-progress pictures. I kept working on this for a few months, knotting a row or two now and then, until the bag was long enough for the book, then I closed the bottom by taking one cord from the front and the corresponding on the back, knotting them together (I don t remember how) and finally I made a rigid triangle of tight square knots with all of the cords, progressively leaving out a cord from each side, and cutting it in a fringe. I then measured the remaining cords, and saw that the shortest ones were about a meter long, but the longest ones were up to 3 meters, I could have cut them much shorter at the beginning (and maybe added a couple more cords). The leftovers will be used, in some way. And then I postponed taking pictures of the finished object for a few months. The same bag, empty and showing how the sides aren't straight. Now the result is functional, but I have to admit it is somewhat ugly: not as much for the lack of a pattern (that I think came out quite fine) but because of how irregular the knots are; I m not confident that the next time I will be happy with their regularity, either, but I hope I will improve, and that s one important thing. And the other important thing is: I enjoyed making this, even if I kept interrupting the work, and I think that there may be some other macrame in my future.

30 January 2024

Matthew Palmer: Why Certificate Lifecycle Automation Matters

If you ve perused the ActivityPub feed of certificates whose keys are known to be compromised, and clicked on the Show More button to see the name of the certificate issuer, you may have noticed that some issuers seem to come up again and again. This might make sense after all, if a CA is issuing a large volume of certificates, they ll be seen more often in a list of compromised certificates. In an attempt to see if there is anything that we can learn from this data, though, I did a bit of digging, and came up with some illuminating results.

The Procedure I started off by finding all the unexpired certificates logged in Certificate Transparency (CT) logs that have a key that is in the pwnedkeys database as having been publicly disclosed. From this list of certificates, I removed duplicates by matching up issuer/serial number tuples, and then reduced the set by counting the number of unique certificates by their issuer. This gave me a list of the issuers of these certificates, which looks a bit like this: 
/C=BE/O=GlobalSign nv-sa/CN=AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G4
/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Sectigo Limited/CN=Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA
/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Sectigo Limited/CN=Sectigo RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA
/C=US/ST=Arizona/L=Scottsdale/O=GoDaddy.com, Inc./OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository//CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2
/C=US/ST=Arizona/L=Scottsdale/O=Starfield Technologies, Inc./OU=http://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository//CN=Starfield Secure Certificate Authority - G2
/C=AT/O=ZeroSSL/CN=ZeroSSL RSA Domain Secure Site CA
/C=BE/O=GlobalSign nv-sa/CN=GlobalSign GCC R3 DV TLS CA 2020
Rather than try to work with raw issuers (because, as Andrew Ayer says, The SSL Certificate Issuer Field is a Lie), I mapped these issuers to the organisations that manage them, and summed the counts for those grouped issuers together.

The Data
Lieutenant Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation Insert obligatory "not THAT data" comment here
The end result of this work is the following table, sorted by the count of certificates which have been compromised by exposing their private key:
IssuerCompromised Count
Sectigo170
ISRG (Let's Encrypt)161
GoDaddy141
DigiCert81
GlobalSign46
Entrust3
SSL.com1
If you re familiar with the CA ecosystem, you ll probably recognise that the organisations with large numbers of compromised certificates are also those who issue a lot of certificates. So far, nothing particularly surprising, then. Let s look more closely at the relationships, though, to see if we can get more useful insights.

Volume Control Using the issuance volume report from crt.sh, we can compare issuance volumes to compromise counts, to come up with a compromise rate . I m using the Unexpired Precertificates colume from the issuance volume report, as I feel that s the number that best matches the certificate population I m examining to find compromised certificates. To maintain parity with the previous table, this one is still sorted by the count of certificates that have been compromised.
IssuerIssuance VolumeCompromised CountCompromise Rate
Sectigo88,323,0681701 in 519,547
ISRG (Let's Encrypt)315,476,4021611 in 1,959,480
GoDaddy56,121,4291411 in 398,024
DigiCert144,713,475811 in 1,786,586
GlobalSign1,438,485461 in 31,271
Entrust23,16631 in 7,722
SSL.com171,81611 in 171,816
If we now sort this table by compromise rate, we can see which organisations have the most (and least) leakiness going on from their customers:
IssuerIssuance VolumeCompromised CountCompromise Rate
Entrust23,16631 in 7,722
GlobalSign1,438,485461 in 31,271
SSL.com171,81611 in 171,816
GoDaddy56,121,4291411 in 398,024
Sectigo88,323,0681701 in 519,547
DigiCert144,713,475811 in 1,786,586
ISRG (Let's Encrypt)315,476,4021611 in 1,959,480
By grouping by order-of-magnitude in the compromise rate, we can identify three bands :
  • The Super Leakers: Customers of Entrust and GlobalSign seem to love to lose control of their private keys. For Entrust, at least, though, the small volumes involved make the numbers somewhat untrustworthy. The three compromised certificates could very well belong to just one customer, for instance. I m not aware of anything that GlobalSign does that would make them such an outlier, either, so I m inclined to think they just got unlucky with one or two customers, but as CAs don t include customer IDs in the certificates they issue, it s not possible to say whether that s the actual cause or not.
  • The Regular Leakers: Customers of SSL.com, GoDaddy, and Sectigo all have compromise rates in the 1-in-hundreds-of-thousands range. Again, the low volumes of SSL.com make the numbers somewhat unreliable, but the other two organisations in this group have large enough numbers that we can rely on that data fairly well, I think.
  • The Low Leakers: Customers of DigiCert and Let s Encrypt are at least three times less likely than customers of the regular leakers to lose control of their private keys. Good for them!
Now we have some useful insights we can think about.

Why Is It So?
Professor Julius Sumner Miller If you don't know who Professor Julius Sumner Miller is, I highly recommend finding out
All of the organisations on the list, with the exception of Let s Encrypt, are what one might term traditional CAs. To a first approximation, it s reasonable to assume that the vast majority of the customers of these traditional CAs probably manage their certificates the same way they have for the past two decades or more. That is, they generate a key and CSR, upload the CSR to the CA to get a certificate, then copy the cert and key somewhere. Since humans are handling the keys, there s a higher risk of the humans using either risky practices, or making a mistake, and exposing the private key to the world. Let s Encrypt, on the other hand, issues all of its certificates using the ACME (Automatic Certificate Management Environment) protocol, and all of the Let s Encrypt documentation encourages the use of software tools to generate keys, issue certificates, and install them for use. Given that Let s Encrypt has 161 compromised certificates currently in the wild, it s clear that the automation in use is far from perfect, but the significantly lower compromise rate suggests to me that lifecycle automation at least reduces the rate of key compromise, even though it doesn t eliminate it completely.

Explaining the Outlier The difference in presumed issuance practices would seem to explain the significant difference in compromise rates between Let s Encrypt and the other organisations, if it weren t for one outlier. This is a largely traditional CA, with the manual-handling issues that implies, but with a compromise rate close to that of Let s Encrypt. We are, of course, talking about DigiCert. The thing about DigiCert, that doesn t show up in the raw numbers from crt.sh, is that DigiCert manages the issuance of certificates for several of the biggest hosted TLS providers, such as CloudFlare and AWS. When these services obtain a certificate from DigiCert on their customer s behalf, the private key is kept locked away, and no human can (we hope) get access to the private key. This is supported by the fact that no certificates identifiably issued to either CloudFlare or AWS appear in the set of certificates with compromised keys. When we ask for all certificates issued by DigiCert , we get both the certificates issued to these big providers, which are very good at keeping their keys under control, as well as the certificates issued to everyone else, whose key handling practices may not be quite so stringent. It s possible, though not trivial, to account for certificates issued to these hosted TLS providers, because the certificates they use are issued from intermediates branded to those companies. With the crt.sh psql interface we can run this query to get the total number of unexpired precertificates issued to these managed services: 
SELECT SUM(sub.NUM_ISSUED[2] - sub.NUM_EXPIRED[2])
  FROM (
    SELECT ca.name, max(coalesce(coalesce(nullif(trim(cc.SUBORDINATE_CA_OWNER), ''), nullif(trim(cc.CA_OWNER), '')), cc.INCLUDED_CERTIFICATE_OWNER)) as OWNER,
           ca.NUM_ISSUED, ca.NUM_EXPIRED
      FROM ccadb_certificate cc, ca_certificate cac, ca
     WHERE cc.CERTIFICATE_ID = cac.CERTIFICATE_ID
       AND cac.CA_ID = ca.ID
  GROUP BY ca.ID
  ) sub
 WHERE sub.name ILIKE '%Amazon%' OR sub.name ILIKE '%CloudFlare%' AND sub.owner = 'DigiCert';
The number I get from running that query is 104,316,112, which should be subtracted from DigiCert s total issuance figures to get a more accurate view of what DigiCert s regular customers do with their private keys. When I do this, the compromise rates table, sorted by the compromise rate, looks like this:
IssuerIssuance VolumeCompromised CountCompromise Rate
Entrust23,16631 in 7,722
GlobalSign1,438,485461 in 31,271
SSL.com171,81611 in 171,816
GoDaddy56,121,4291411 in 398,024
"Regular" DigiCert40,397,363811 in 498,732
Sectigo88,323,0681701 in 519,547
All DigiCert144,713,475811 in 1,786,586
ISRG (Let's Encrypt)315,476,4021611 in 1,959,480
In short, it appears that DigiCert s regular customers are just as likely as GoDaddy or Sectigo customers to expose their private keys.

What Does It All Mean? The takeaway from all this is fairly straightforward, and not overly surprising, I believe.

The less humans have to do with certificate issuance, the less likely they are to compromise that certificate by exposing the private key. While it may not be surprising, it is nice to have some empirical evidence to back up the common wisdom. Fully-managed TLS providers, such as CloudFlare, AWS Certificate Manager, and whatever Azure s thing is called, is the platonic ideal of this principle: never give humans any opportunity to expose a private key. I m not saying you should use one of these providers, but the security approach they have adopted appears to be the optimal one, and should be emulated universally. The ACME protocol is the next best, in that there are a variety of standardised tools widely available that allow humans to take themselves out of the loop, but it s still possible for humans to handle (and mistakenly expose) key material if they try hard enough. Legacy issuance methods, which either cannot be automated, or require custom, per-provider automation to be developed, appear to be at least four times less helpful to the goal of avoiding compromise of the private key associated with a certificate.

Humans Are, Of Course, The Problem
Bender, the robot from Futurama, asking if we'd like to kill all humans No thanks, Bender, I'm busy tonight
This observation that if you don t let humans near keys, they don t get leaked is further supported by considering the biggest issuers by volume who have not issued any certificates whose keys have been compromised: Google Trust Services (fourth largest issuer overall, with 57,084,529 unexpired precertificates), and Microsoft Corporation (sixth largest issuer overall, with 22,852,468 unexpired precertificates). It appears that somewhere between most and basically all of the certificates these organisations issue are to customers of their public clouds, and my understanding is that the keys for these certificates are managed in same manner as CloudFlare and AWS the keys are locked away where humans can t get to them. It should, of course, go without saying that if a human can never have access to a private key, it makes it rather difficult for a human to expose it. More broadly, if you are building something that handles sensitive or secret data, the more you can do to keep humans out of the loop, the better everything will be.

Your Support is Appreciated If you d like to see more analysis of how key compromise happens, and the lessons we can learn from examining billions of certificates, please show your support by buying me a refreshing beverage. Trawling CT logs is thirsty work.

Appendix: Methodology Limitations In the interests of clarity, I feel it s important to describe ways in which my research might be flawed. Here are the things I know of that may have impacted the accuracy, that I couldn t feasibly account for.
  • Time Periods: Because time never stops, there is likely to be some slight mismatches in the numbers obtained from the various data sources, because they weren t collected at exactly the same moment.
  • Issuer-to-Organisation Mapping: It s possible that the way I mapped issuers to organisations doesn t match exactly with how crt.sh does it, meaning that counts might be skewed. I tried to minimise that by using the same data sources (the CCADB AllCertificates report) that I believe that crt.sh uses for its mapping, but I cannot be certain of a perfect match.
  • Unwarranted Grouping: I ve drawn some conclusions about the practices of the various organisations based on their general approach to certificate issuance. If a particular subordinate CA that I ve grouped into the parent organisation is managed in some unusual way, that might cause my conclusions to be erroneous. I was able to fairly easily separate out CloudFlare, AWS, and Azure, but there are almost certainly others that I didn t spot, because hoo boy there are a lot of intermediate CAs out there.

29 January 2024

Russ Allbery: Review: Bluebird

Review: Bluebird, by Ciel Pierlot
Publisher: Angry Robot
Copyright: 2022
ISBN: 0-85766-967-2
Format: Kindle
Pages: 458
Bluebird is a stand-alone far-future science fiction adventure. Ten thousand years ago, a star fell into the galaxy carrying three factions of humanity. The Ascetics, the Ossuary, and the Pyrites each believe that only their god survived and the other two factions are heretics. Between them, they have conquered the rest of the galaxy and its non-human species. The only thing the factions hate worse than each other are those who attempt to stay outside the faction system. Rig used to be a Pyrite weapon designer before she set fire to her office and escaped with her greatest invention. Now she's a Nightbird, a member of an outlaw band that tries to help refugees and protect her fellow Kashrini against Pyrite genocide. On her side, she has her girlfriend, an Ascetic librarian; her ship, Bluebird; and her guns, Panache and Pizzazz. And now, perhaps, the mysterious Ginka, a Zazra empath and remarkably capable fighter who helps Rig escape from an ambush by Pyrite soldiers. Rig wants to stay alive, help her people, and defy the factions. Pyrite wants Rig's secrets and, as leverage, has her sister. What Ginka wants is not entirely clear even to Ginka. This book is absurd, but I still had fun with it. It's dangerous for me to compare things to anime given how little anime that I've watched, but Bluebird had that vibe for me: anime, or maybe Japanese RPGs or superhero comics. The storytelling is very visual, combat-oriented, and not particularly realistic. Rig is a pistol sharpshooter and Ginka is the type of undefined deadly acrobatic fighter so often seen in that type of media. In addition to her ship, Rig has a gorgeous hand-maintained racing hoverbike with a beautiful paint job. It's that sort of book. It's also the sort of book where the characters obey cinematic logic designed to maximize dramatic physical confrontations, even if their actions make no logical sense. There is no facial recognition or screening, and it's bizarrely easy for the protagonists to end up in same physical location as high-up bad guys. One of the weapon systems that's critical to the plot makes no sense whatsoever. At critical moments, the bad guys behave more like final bosses in a video game, picking up weapons to deal with the protagonists directly instead of using their supposedly vast armies of agents. There is supposedly a whole galaxy full of civilizations with capital worlds covered in planet-spanning cities, but politics barely exist and the faction leaders get directly involved in the plot. If you are looking for a realistic projection of technology or society, I cannot stress enough that this is not the book that you're looking for. You probably figured that out when I mentioned ten thousand years of war, but that will only be the beginning of the suspension of disbelief problems. You need to turn off your brain and enjoy the action sequences and melodrama. I'm normally good at that, and I admit I still struggled because the plot logic is such a mismatch with the typical novels I read. There are several points where the characters do something that seems so monumentally dumb that I was sure Pierlot was setting them up for a fall, and then I got wrong-footed because their plan worked fine, or exploded for unrelated reasons. I think this type of story, heavy on dramatic eye-candy and emotional moments with swelling soundtracks, is a lot easier to pull off in visual media where all the pretty pictures distract your brain. In a novel, there's a lot of time to think about the strategy, technology, and government structure, which for this book is not a good idea. If you can get past that, though, Rig is entertainingly snarky and Ginka, who turns out to be the emotional heart of the book, is an enjoyable character with a real growth arc. Her background is a bit simplistic and the villains are the sort of pure evil that you might expect from this type of cinematic plot, but I cared about the outcome of her story. Some parts of the plot dragged and I think the editing could have been tighter, but there was enough competence porn and banter to pull me through. I would recommend Bluebird only cautiously, since you're going to need to turn off large portions of your brain and be in the right mood for nonsensically dramatic confrontations, but I don't regret reading it. It's mostly in primary colors and the emotional conflicts are not what anyone would call subtle, but it delivers a character arc and a somewhat satisfying ending. Content warning: There is a lot of serious physical injury in this book, including surgical maiming. If that's going to bother you, you may want to give this one a pass. Rating: 6 out of 10

26 January 2024

Bastian Venthur: Investigating popularity of Python build backends over time

Inspired by a Mastodon post by Fran oise Conil, who investigated the current popularity of build backends used in pyproject.toml files, I wanted to investigate how the popularity of build backends used in pyproject.toml files evolved over the years since the introduction of PEP-0517 in 2015. Getting the data Tom Forbes provides a huge dataset that contains information about every file within every release uploaded to PyPI. To get the current dataset, we can use: 
curl -L --remote-name-all $(curl -L "https://github.com/pypi-data/data/raw/main/links/dataset.txt")
This will download approximately 30GB of parquet files, providing detailed information about each file included in a PyPI upload, including:
  1. project name, version and release date
  2. file path, size and line count
  3. hash of the file
The dataset does not contain the actual files themselves though, more on that in a moment. Querying the dataset using duckdb We can now use duckdb to query the parquet files directly. Let s look into the schema first: 
describe select * from '*.parquet';
 
    column_name     column_type    null    
      varchar         varchar     varchar  
 
  project_name      VARCHAR       YES      
  project_version   VARCHAR       YES      
  project_release   VARCHAR       YES      
  uploaded_on       TIMESTAMP     YES      
  path              VARCHAR       YES      
  archive_path      VARCHAR       YES      
  size              UBIGINT       YES      
  hash              BLOB          YES      
  skip_reason       VARCHAR       YES      
  lines             UBIGINT       YES      
  repository        UINTEGER      YES      
 
  11 rows                       6 columns
From all files mentioned in the dataset, we only care about pyproject.toml files that are in the project s root directory. Since we ll still have to download the actual files, we need to get the path and the repository to construct the corresponding URL to the mirror that contains all files in a bunch of huge git repositories. Some files are not available on the mirrors; to skip these, we only take files where the skip_reason is empty. We also care about the timestamp of the upload (uploaded_on) and the hash to avoid processing identical files twice: 
select
    path,
    hash,
    uploaded_on,
    repository
from '*.parquet'
where
    skip_reason == '' and
    lower(string_split(path, '/')[-1]) == 'pyproject.toml' and
    len(string_split(path, '/')) == 5
order by uploaded_on desc
This query runs for a few minutes on my laptop and returns ~1.2M rows. Getting the actual files Using the repository and path, we can now construct an URL from which we can fetch the actual file for further processing: 
url = f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pypi-data/pypi-mirror- repository /code/ path "
We can download the individual pyproject.toml files and parse them to read the build-backend into a dictionary mapping the file-hash to the build backend. Downloads on GitHub are rate-limited, so downloading 1.2M files will take a couple of days. By skipping files with a hash we ve already processed, we can avoid downloading the same file more than once, cutting the required downloads by circa 50%. Results Assuming the data is complete and my analysis is sound, these are the findings: There is a surprising amount of build backends in use, but the overall amount of uploads per build backend decreases quickly, with a long tail of single uploads: 
>>> results.backend.value_counts()
backend
setuptools        701550
poetry            380830
hatchling          56917
flit               36223
pdm                11437
maturin             9796
jupyter             1707
mesonpy              625
scikit               556
                   ...
postry                 1
tree                   1
setuptoos              1
neuron                 1
avalon                 1
maturimaturinn         1
jsonpath               1
ha                     1
pyo3                   1
Name: count, Length: 73, dtype: int64
We pick only the top 4 build backends, and group the remaining ones (including PDM and Maturin) into other so they are accounted for as well. The following plot shows the relative distribution of build backends over time. Each bin represents a time span of 28 days. I chose 28 days to reduce visual clutter. Within each bin, the height of the bars corresponds to the relative proportion of uploads during that time interval: Relative distribution of build backends over time Looking at the right side of the plot, we see the current distribution. It confirms Fran oise s findings about the current popularity of build backends: Between 2018 and 2020 the graph exhibits significant fluctuations, due to the relatively low amount uploads utizing pyproject.toml files. During that early period, Flit started as the most popular build backend, but was eventually displaced by Setuptools and Poetry. Between 2020 and 2020, the overall usage of pyproject.toml files increased significantly. By the end of 2022, the share of Setuptools peaked at 70%. After 2020, other build backends experienced a gradual rise in popularity. Amongh these, Hatch emerged as a notable contender, steadily gaining traction and ultimately stabilizing at 10%. We can also look into the absolute distribution of build backends over time: Absolute distribution of build backends over time The plot shows that Setuptools has the strongest growth trajectory, surpassing all other build backends. Poetry and Hatch are growing at a comparable rate, but since Hatch started roughly 4 years after Poetry, it s lagging behind in popularity. Despite not being among the most widely used backends anymore, Flit maintains a steady and consistent growth pattern, indicating its enduring relevance in the Python packaging landscape. The script for downloading and analyzing the data can be found in my GitHub repository. It contains the results of the duckb query (so you don t have to download the full dataset) and the pickled dictionary, mapping the file hashes to the build backends, saving you days for downloading and analyzing the pyproject.toml files yourself.

Reproducible Builds (diffoscope): diffoscope 255 released

The diffoscope maintainers are pleased to announce the release of diffoscope version 255. This version includes the following changes: 
[ Vekhir ]
* Add/fix compatibility for Python progressbar 2.5 & 3.0 etc.
[ Chris Lamb ]
* Update copyright years.
You find out more by visiting the project homepage.

19 January 2024

Russell Coker: 2.5Gbit Ethernet

I just decided to upgrade the core of my home network from 1Gbit to 2.5Gbit. I didn t really need to do this, it was only about 5 years ago that I upgrade from 100Mbit to 1Gbit. but it s cheap and seemed interesting. I decided to do it because a 2.5Gbit switch was listed as cheap on Ozbargain Computing [1], that was $40.94 delivered. If you are in Australia and like computers then Ozbargain is a site worth polling, every day there s interesting things at low prices. The seller of the switch is KeeplinkStore [2] who distinguished themselves by phoning me from China to inform me that I had ordered a switch with a UK plug for delivery to Australia and suggesting that I cancel the order and make a new order with an Australian plug. It wouldn t have been a big deal if I had received a UK plug as I ve got a collection of adaptors but it was still nice of them to make it convenient for me. The switch basically does what it s expected to do and has no fan so it s quiet. I got a single port 2.5Gbit PCIe card for $18.77 and a dual port card for $34.07. Those cards are a little expensive when compared to 1Gbit cards but very cheap when compared to the computers they are installed in. These cards use the Realtek RTL8125 chipset and work well. I got a USB-3 2.5Gbit device for $17.43. I deliberately didn t get USB-C because I still use laptops without USB-C and most of the laptops with USB-C only have a single USB-C port which is used for power. I don t plan to stop using my 100Mbit USB ethernet device because most of the time I don t need a lot of speed. But sometimes I do things like testing auto-install on laptops and then having something faster than Gigabit is good. This card worked at 1Gbit speed on a 1Gbit network when used with a system running Debian/Bookworm with kernel 6.1 and worked at 2.5Gbit speed when connected to my LicheePi RISC-V system running Linux 5.10, but it would only do 100Mbit on my laptop running Debian/Unstable with kernel 6.6 (Debian Bug #1061095) [3]. It s a little disappointing but not many people have such hardware so it probably doesn t get a lot of testing. For the moment I plan to just use a 1Gbit USB Ethernet device most of the time and if I really need the speed I ll just use an older kernel. I did some tests with wget and curl to see if I could get decent speeds. When using wget 1.21.3 on Debian/Bookworm I got transfer speeds of 103MB/s and 18.8s of system CPU time out of 23.6s of elapsed time. Curl on Debian/Bookworm did 203MB/s and took 10.7s of system CPU time out of 11.8s elapsed time. The difference is that curl was using 100KB read buffers and a mix of 12K and 4K write buffers while wget was using 8KB read buffers and 4KB write buffers. On Debian/Unstable wget 1.21.4 uses 64K read buffers and a mix of 4K and 60K write buffers and gets a speed of 208MB/s. As an experiment I changed the read buffer size for wget to 256K and that got the speed up to around 220MB/s but it was difficult to measure as the occasional packet loss slowed things down. The pattern of writing 4K and then writing the rest continued, it seemed related to fwrite() buffering. For anyone else who wants to experiment with the code, the wget code is simpler (due to less features) and the package builds a lot faster (due to fewer tests) so that s the one to work on. The client machine for these tests has a E5-2696 v3 CPU, this doesn t compare well to some of the recent AMD CPUs on single-core performance but is still a decently powerful system. Getting good performance at Gigabit speeds on an ARM or RISC-V system is probably going to be a lot harder than getting good performance at 2.5Gbit speeds on this system. In conclusion 2.5Gbit basically works apart from a problem with new kernels and a problem with the old version of wget. I expect that when Debian/Trixie is released (probably mid 2025) things will work well. For good transfer rates use wget version 1.21.4 or newer or use curl. As an aside I use a 1500byte MTU because I have some 100baseT systems on my LAN and the settings regarding TCP acceleration etc are all the defaults.
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16 January 2024

Jonathan Dowland: Two reissued Coil LPs

Happy 2024! DAIS have continued their programme of posthumous Coil remasters and re-issues. Constant Shallowness Leads To Evil was remastered by Josh Bonati in 2021 and re-released in 2022 in a dizzying array of different packaging variants. The original releases in 2000 had barely any artwork, and given that void I think Nathaniel Young has done a great job of creating something compelling.
Constant Shallowness leads to Evil and Queens of te Circulating Library
A limited number of the original re-issue have special lenticular covers, although these were not sold by any distributors outside the US. I tried to find a copy on my trip to Portland in 2022, to no avail. Last year DAIS followed Constant with Queens Of The Circulating Library, same deal: limited lenticular covers, US only. Both are also available digital-only, e.g. on Bandcamp: Constant , Queens . The original, pre-remastered releases have been freely available on archive.org for a long time: Constant , Queens Both of these releases feel to me that they were made available by the group somewhat as an afterthought, having been produced primarily as part of their live efforts. (I'm speculating freely here, it might not be true). Live takes of some of this material exist in the form of Coil Presents Time Machines, which has not (yet) been reissued. In my opinion this is a really compelling recording. I vividly remember listening to this whilst trying to get an hour's rest in a hotel somewhere on a work trip. It took me to some strange places! I'll leave you from one of my favourite moments from "Colour Sound Oblivion", Coil's video collection of live backdrops. When this was performed live it was also called "Constant Shallowness Leads To Evil", although it's distinct from the material on the LP: also available on archive.org. A version of this Constant made it onto a Russian live bootleg, which is available on Spotify and Bandcamp complete with some John Balance banter: we only do this on religious holidays Constant Shallowness Leads to Evil by Coil

Thomas Koch: Missing memegen

Posted on May 1, 2022
Tags: debian, free software, life
Back at $COMPANY we had an internal meme-site. I had some reputation in my team for creating good memes. When I watched Episode 3 of Season 2 from Yes Premier Minister yesterday, I really missed a place to post memes. This is the full scene. Please watch it or even the full episode before scrolling down to the GIFs. I had a good laugh for some time. With Debian, I could just download the episode from somewhere on the net with youtube-dl and easily create two GIFs using ffmpeg, with and without subtitle: 
ffmpeg  -ss 0:5:59.600 -to 0:6:11.150 -i Downloads/Yes.Prime.Minister.S02E03-1254485068289.mp4 tmp/tragic.gif
ffmpeg  -ss 0:5:59.600 -to 0:6:11.150 -i Downloads/Yes.Prime.Minister.S02E03-1254485068289.mp4 \
        -vf "subtitles=tmp/sub.srt:force_style='Fontsize=60'" tmp/tragic_with_subtitle.gif
And this sub.srt file: 
1
00:00:10,000 --> 00:00:12,000
Tragic.
I believe, one needs to install the libavfilter-extra variant to burn the subtitle in the GIF. Some space to hide the GIFs. The Premier Minister just learned, that his predecessor, who was about to publish embarassing memories, died of a sudden heart attack: I can t actually think of a meme with this GIF, that the internal thought police community moderation would not immediately take down. For a moment I thought that it would be fun to have a Meme-Site for Debian members. But it is probably not the right time for this. Maybe somebody likes the above GIFs though and wants to use them somewhere.

15 January 2024

Russ Allbery: Review: The Library of Broken Worlds

Review: The Library of Broken Worlds, by Alaya Dawn Johnson
Publisher: Scholastic Press
Copyright: June 2023
ISBN: 1-338-29064-9
Format: Kindle
Pages: 446
The Library of Broken Worlds is a young-adult far-future science fantasy. So far as I can tell, it's stand-alone, although more on that later in the review. Freida is the adopted daughter of Nadi, the Head Librarian, and her greatest wish is to become a librarian herself. When the book opens, she's a teenager in highly competitive training. Freida is low-wetware, without the advanced and expensive enhancements of many of the other students competing for rare and prized librarian positions, which she makes up for by being the most audacious. She doesn't need wetware to commune with the library material gods. If one ventures deep into their tunnels and consumes their crystals, direct physical communion is possible. The library tunnels are Freida's second home, in part because that's where she was born. She was created by the Library, and specifically by Iemaja, the youngest of the material gods. Precisely why is a mystery. To Nadi, Freida is her daughter. To Quinn, Nadi's main political rival within the library, Freida is a thing, a piece of the library, a secondary and possibly rogue AI. A disruptive annoyance. The Library of Broken Worlds is the sort of science fiction where figuring out what is going on is an integral part of the reading experience. It opens with a frame story of an unnamed girl (clearly Freida) waking the god Nameren and identifying herself as designed for deicide. She provokes Nameren's curiosity and offers an Arabian Nights bargain: if he wants to hear her story, he has to refrain from killing her for long enough for her to tell it. As one might expect, the main narrative doesn't catch up to the frame story until the very end of the book. The Library is indeed some type of library that librarians can search for knowledge that isn't available from more mundane sources, but Freida's personal experience of it is almost wholly religious and oracular. The library's material gods are identified as AIs, but good luck making sense of the story through a science fiction frame, even with a healthy allowance for sufficiently advanced technology being indistinguishable from magic. The symbolism and tone is entirely fantasy, and late in the book it becomes clear that whatever the material gods are, they're not simple technological AIs in the vein of, say, Banks's Ship Minds. Also, the Library is not solely a repository of knowledge. It is the keeper of an interstellar peace. The Library was founded after the Great War, to prevent a recurrence. It functions as a sort of legal system and grand tribunal in ways that are never fully explained. As you might expect, that peace is based more on stability than fairness. Five of the players in this far future of humanity are the Awilu, the most advanced society and the first to leave Earth (or Tierra as it's called here); the Mah m, who possess the material war god Nameren of the frame story; the Lunars and Martians, who dominate the Sol system; and the surviving Tierrans, residents of a polluted and struggling planet that is ruthlessly exploited by the Lunars. The problem facing Freida and her friends at the start of the book is a petition brought by a young Tierran against Lunar exploitation of his homeland. His name is Joshua, and Freida is more than half in love with him. Joshua's legal argument involves interpretation of the freedom node of the treaty that ended the Great War, a node that precedent says gives the Lunars the freedom to exploit Tierra, but which Joshua claims has a still-valid originalist meaning granting Tierrans freedom from exploitation. There is, in short, a lot going on in this book, and "never fully explained" is something of a theme. Freida is telling a story to Nameren and only explains things Nameren may not already know. The reader has to puzzle out the rest from the occasional hint. This is made more difficult by the tendency of the material gods to communicate only in visions or guided hallucinations, full of symbolism that the characters only partly explain to the reader. Nonetheless, this did mostly work, at least for me. I started this book very confused, but by about the midpoint it felt like the background was coming together. I'm still not sure I understand the aurochs, baobab, and cicada symbolism that's so central to the framing story, but it's the pleasant sort of stretchy confusion that gives my brain a good workout. I wish Johnson had explained a few more things plainly, particularly near the end of the book, but my remaining level of confusion was within my tolerances. Unfortunately, the ending did not work for me. The first time I read it, I had no idea what it meant. Lots of baffling, symbolic things happened and then the book just stopped. After re-reading the last 10%, I think all the pieces of an ending and a bit of an explanation are there, but it's absurdly abbreviated. This is another book where the author appears to have been finished with the story before I was. This keeps happening to me, so this probably says something more about me than it says about books, but I want books to have an ending. If the characters have fought and suffered through the plot, I want them to have some space to be happy and to see how their sacrifices play out, with more detail than just a few vague promises. If much of the book has been puzzling out the nature of the world, I would like some concrete confirmation of at least some of my guesswork. And if you're going to end the book on radical transformation, I want to see the results of that transformation. Johnson does an excellent job showing how brutal the peace of the powerful can be, and is willing to light more things on fire over the course of this book than most authors would, but then doesn't offer the reader much in the way of payoff. For once, I wish this stand-alone turned out to be a series. I think an additional book could be written in the aftermath of this ending, and I would definitely read that novel. Johnson has me caring deeply about these characters and fascinated by the world background, and I'd happily spend another 450 pages finding out what happens next. But, frustratingly, I think this ending was indeed intended to wrap up the story. I think this book may fall between a few stools. Science fiction readers who want mysterious future worlds to be explained by the end of the book are going to be frustrated by the amount of symbolism, allusion, and poetic description. Literary fantasy readers, who have a higher tolerance for that style, are going to wish for more focused and polished writing. A lot of the story is firmly YA: trying and failing to fit in, developing one's identity, coming into power, relationship drama, great betrayals and regrets, overcoming trauma and abuse, and unraveling lies that adults tell you. But this is definitely not a straight-forward YA plot or world background. It demands a lot from the reader, and while I am confident many teenage readers would rise to that challenge, it seems like an awkward fit for the YA marketing category. About 75% of the way in, I would have told you this book was great and you should read it. The ending was a let-down and I'm still grumpy about it. I still think it's worth your attention if you're in the mood for a sink-or-swim type of reading experience. Just be warned that when the ride ends, I felt unceremoniously dumped on the pavement. Content warnings: Rape, torture, genocide. Rating: 7 out of 10

12 January 2024

Freexian Collaborators: Monthly report about Debian Long Term Support, December 2023 (by Roberto C. S nchez)

Like each month, have a look at the work funded by Freexian s Debian LTS offering.

Debian LTS contributors In December, 18 contributors have been paid to work on Debian LTS, their reports are available:
  • Abhijith PA did 7.0h (out of 7.0h assigned and 7.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 7.0h to the next month.
  • Adrian Bunk did 16.0h (out of 26.25h assigned and 8.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 19.0h to the next month.
  • Bastien Roucari s did 16.0h (out of 16.0h assigned and 4.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 4.0h to the next month.
  • Ben Hutchings did 8.0h (out of 7.25h assigned and 16.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 16.0h to the next month.
  • Chris Lamb did 18.0h (out of 18.0h assigned).
  • Emilio Pozuelo Monfort did 8.0h (out of 26.75h assigned and 8.25h from previous period), thus carrying over 27.0h to the next month.
  • Guilhem Moulin did 25.0h (out of 18.0h assigned and 7.0h from previous period).
  • Holger Levsen did 5.5h (out of 5.5h assigned).
  • Jochen Sprickerhof did 0.0h (out of 0h assigned and 10.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 10.0h to the next month.
  • Lee Garrett did 0.0h (out of 25.75h assigned and 9.25h from previous period), thus carrying over 35.0h to the next month.
  • Markus Koschany did 35.0h (out of 35.0h assigned).
  • Roberto C. S nchez did 9.5h (out of 5.5h assigned and 6.5h from previous period), thus carrying over 2.5h to the next month.
  • Santiago Ruano Rinc n did 8.255h (out of 3.26h assigned and 12.745h from previous period), thus carrying over 7.75h to the next month.
  • Sean Whitton did 4.25h (out of 3.25h assigned and 6.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 5.75h to the next month.
  • Sylvain Beucler did 16.5h (out of 21.25h assigned and 13.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 18.5h to the next month.
  • Thorsten Alteholz did 14.0h (out of 14.0h assigned).
  • Tobias Frost did 10.25h (out of 12.0h assigned), thus carrying over 1.75h to the next month.
  • Utkarsh Gupta did 18.75h (out of 11.25h assigned and 13.5h from previous period), thus carrying over 6.0h to the next month.

Evolution of the situation In December, we have released 29 DLAs. A particularly notable update in December was prepared by LTS contributor Santiago Ruano Rinc n for the openssh package. The updated produced DLA-3694-1 and included a fix for the Terrapin Attack (CVE-2023-48795), which was a rather serious flaw in the SSH protocol itself. The package bluez was the subject of another notable update by LTS contributor Chris Lamb, which resulted in DLA-3689-1 to address an insecure default configuration which allowed attackers to inject keyboard commands over Bluetooth without first authenticating. The LTS team continues its efforts to have a positive impact beyond the boundaries of LTS. Several contributors worked on packages, preparing LTS updates, but also preparing patches or full updates which were uploaded to the unstable, stable, and oldstable distributions, including: Guilhem Moulin s update of tinyxml (uploads to LTS and unstable and patches submitted to the security team for stable and oldstable); Guilhem Moulin s update of xerces-c (uploads to LTS and unstable and patches submitted to the security team for oldstable); Thorsten Alteholz s update of libde265 (uploads to LTS and stable and additional patches submitted to the maintainer for stable and oldstable); Thorsten Alteholz s update of cjson (upload to LTS and patches submitted to the maintainer for stable and oldstable); and Tobias Frost s update of opendkim (sponsor maintainer-prepared upload to LTS and additionally prepared updates for stable and oldstable). Going beyond Debian and looking to the broader community, LTS contributor Bastien Roucari s was contacted by SUSE concerning an update he had prepared for zbar. He was able to assist by coordinating with the former organization of the original zbar author to secure for SUSE access to information concerning the exploits. This has enabled another distribution to benefit from the work done in support of LTS and from the assistance of Bastien in coordinating the access to information. Finally, LTS contributor Santiago Ruano Rinc n continued work relating to how updates for packages in statically-linked language ecosystems (e.g., Go, Rust, and others) are handled. The work is presently focused on more accurately and reliably identifying which packages are impacted in a given update scenario to enable notifications to be published so that users will be made aware of these situations as they occur. As the work continues, it will eventually result in improvements to Debian infrustructure so that the LTS team and Security team are able to manage updates of this nature in a more consistent way.

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9 January 2024

Louis-Philippe V ronneau: 2023 A Musical Retrospective

I ended 2022 with a musical retrospective and very much enjoyed writing that blog post. As such, I have decided to do the same for 2023! From now on, this will probably be an annual thing :) Albums In 2023, I added 73 new albums to my collection nearly 2 albums every three weeks! I listed them below in the order in which I acquired them. I purchased most of these albums when I could and borrowed the rest at libraries. If you want to browse though, I added links to the album covers pointing either to websites where you can buy them or to Discogs when digital copies weren't available. Once again this year, it seems that Punk (mostly O !) and Metal dominate my list, mostly fueled by Angry Metal Guy and the amazing Montr al Skinhead/Punk concert scene.
Nechochwen - Kanawha Black
Nansarunai - Ruins of the Moonlight Temple
Sonja - Loud Arriver
Sigh - Shiki
The Otolith - Folium Limina
Helm - Culture, bravade et m lancolie
Aurora - All My Demons Greeting Me As a Friend
Moonsorrow - Jumalten Aika
High Command - Eclipse of the Dual Moons
Trial - Feed the Fire
Kampfar - Til Klovers Takt
Second to Sun - Nocturnal Philosophy
Lei a - Reue
FROZEN DAWN - The Decline of the Enlightened Gods
OAK - Disintegrate
Carnosus - Visions of Infinihility
KAUAN - ATM Revised
Chick Corea - Crystal Silence
Chick Corea - Light as a Feather
Chick Corea - Children's Songs
Komitern Sect - Des jours plus durs que d'autres
Alexandra Str liski - N o-Romance
Brigada Flores Magon - IMMORTELS
Brigada Flores Magon - S-T
Makeup and Vanity Set - Wavefinder
22 Longs Riffs - Balle Populaire
Esclaves Salari s - a augure mal
Wind Rose - Wintersag
Wind Rose - Warfront
Ultra Razzia - Jusqu'au bout de la nuit
Ultra Razzia - La D mo
La Gachette - travers le temps
Jinjer - Macro
Jinjer - Wallflowers
Mastodon - Leviathan
Mastodon - The Hunter
Hold a Grudge - No Compromise
Total Nada - Total Nada E.P
BLEMISH - BLEMISH
Hold a Grudge - Hold a Grudge
Hold a Grudge - Doing Time
Ch rogne - TRIGGER WARNING
CUIR - ALBUM
Lucifer - Lucifer IV
Coven - Witchcraft Destroys Minds and Reaps Souls
Guernica - crasez vos r ves
RANCO UR - RANC UR
RANCO UR - LAME EN PEINE
Jeremy Dutcher - Motewolonuwok
22 Longs Riffs - bout portant
Street Code - Street Code
Los Tabascos - Sous lacrymos et les pav s
GODTHRYMM - Distortions
Horrendous - Ontological Mysterium
CRAN - Nat
B ton Arm - Au bord du gouffre
B ton Arm - Second Souffle
Force Majeure - Encore Debout
Claimed Choice - Claimed Choice
Claimed Choice - We Won't Give in
Syndrome 81 - Prisons Imaginaires
Sodomisery - Mazzaroth
V A N I S H I N G K I D S - Miracle of Death
WAYFARER - American Gothic
Fire in the Distance - Air Not Meant For Us
Megaton Sword - Might & Power
Krigsgrav - Fires in the Fall
Unto Others - Strenght II ...Deep Cuts
Sworn - A Journey Told through Fire
Ne Obliviscaris - Exul
Svalbard - The Weight of the Mask
By Fire and Sword - Glory
Angelic Upstarts - Who Killed Liddle?
Concerts A trend I started in 2022 was to go to as many concerts of artists I like as possible. I'm happy to report I went to around 80% more concerts in 2023 than in 2022! Looking back at my list, April was quite a busy month... Here are the concerts I went to in 2023: Although metalfinder continues to work as intended, I'm very glad to have discovered the Montr al underground scene has departed from Facebook/Instagram and adopted en masse Gancio, a FOSS community agenda that supports ActivityPub. Our local instance, askapunk.net is pretty much all I could ask for :) That's it for 2023!

3 January 2024

Jacob Adams: Fixing My Shell

For an embarassingly long time, my shell has unnecessarily tried to initialize a console font in every kind of interactive terminal. This leaves the following error message in my terminal: 
Couldn't get a file descriptor referring to the console.
It even shows up twice when running tmux! Clearly I ve done something horrible to my configuration, and now I ve got to clean it up.

How does Shell Initialization Work? The precise files a shell reads at start-up is somewhat complex, and defined by this excellent chart 1: Shell Startup Flowchart For the purposes of what I m trying to fix, there are two paths that matter.
  • Interactive login shell startup
  • Interactive non-login shell startup
As you can see from the above, trying to distinguish these two paths in bash is an absolute mess. zsh, in contrast, is much cleaner and allows for a clear distinction between these two cases, with login shell configuration files as a superset of configuration files used by non-login shells.

How did we get here? I keep my configuration files in a config repository. Some time ago I got quite frustrated at this whole shell initialization thing, and just linked everything together in one profile file: 
.mkshrc -> config/profile
.profile -> config/profile
This appears to have created this mess.

Move to ZSH I ve wanted to move to zsh for a while, and took this opportunity to do so. So my new configuration files are .zprofile and .zshrc instead of .mkshrc and .profile (though I m going to retain those symlinks to allow my old configurations to continue working). mksh is a nice simple shell, but using zsh here allows for more consistency between my home and $WORK environments, and will allow a lot more powerful extensions.

Updating my Prompt ZSH prompts use a totally different configuration via variable expansion. However, it also uses the PROMPT variable, so I set that to the needed values for zsh. There s an excellent ZSH prompt generator at https://zsh-prompt-generator.site that I used to get these variables, though I m sure they re in the zsh documentation somewhere as well. I wanted a simple prompt with user (%n), host (%m), and path (%d). I also wanted a % at the end to distinguish this from other shells. 
PROMPT="%n@%m%d%% "

Fixing mksh prompts This worked but surprisingly mksh also looks at PROMPT, leaving my mksh prompt as the literal prompt string without expansion. Fixing this requires setting up a proper shrc and linking it to .mkshrc and .zshrc. I chose to move my existing aliases script to this file, as it also broke in non-login shells when moved to profile. Within this new shrc file we can check what shell we re running via $0: 
if [ "$0" = "/bin/zsh" ]   [ "$0" = "zsh" ]   [ "$0" = "-zsh" ]
I chose to add plain zsh here in case I run it manually for whatever reason. I also added -zsh to support tmux as that s what it presents as $0. This also means you ll need to be careful to quote $0 or you ll get fun shell errors. There s probably a better way to do this, but I couldn t find something that was compatible with POSIX shell, which is what most of this has to be written in to be compatible with mksh and zsh2. We can then setup different prompts for each: 
if [ "$0" = "/bin/zsh" ]   [ "$0" = "zsh" ]   [ "$0" = "-zsh" ]
then
	PROMPT="%n@%m%d%% "
else
	# Borrowed from
	# http://www.unixmantra.com/2013/05/setting-custom-prompt-in-ksh.html
	PS1='$(id -un)@$(hostname -s)$PWD$ '
fi

Setting Console Font in a Better Way I ve been setting console font via setfont in my .profile for a while. I m not sure where I picked this up, but it s not the right way. I even tried to only run this in a console with -t but that only checks that output is a terminal, not specifically a console. 
if [ -t 1 ]
then
	setfont /usr/share/consolefonts/Lat15-Terminus20x10.psf.gz
fi
This also only runs once the console is logged into, instead of initializing it on boot. The correct way to set this up, on Debian-based systems, is reconfiguring console-setup like so: 
dpkg-reconfigure console-setup
From there you get a menu of encoding, character set, font, and then font size to configure for your consoles.

VIM mode To enable VIM mode for ZSH, you simply need to set: 
bindkeys -v
This allows you to edit your shell commands with basic VIM keybinds.

Getting back Ctrl + Left Arrow and Ctrl + Right Arrow Moving around one word at a time with Ctrl and the arrow keys is broken by vim mode unfortunately, so we ll need to re-enable it: 
bindkey "^[[1;5C" forward-word
bindkey "^[[1;5D" backward-word

Why did it show up twice for tmux? Because tmux creates a login shell. Adding: 
echo PROFILE
to profile and: 
echo SHRC
to shrc confirms this with: 
PROFILE
SHRC
SHRC
For now, profile sources shrc so that running twice is expected. But after this exploration and diagram, it s clear we don t need that for zsh. Removing this will break remote bash shells (see above diagram), but I can live without those on my development laptop. Removing that line results in the expected output for a new terminal: 
SHRC
And the full output for a new tmux session or console: 
PROFILE
SHRC
So finally we re back to a normal state! This post is a bit unfocused but I hope it helps someone else repair or enhance their shell environment. If you liked this4, or know of any other ways to manage this I could use, let me know at fixmyshell@tookmund.com.
  1. This chart comes from the excellent Shell Startup Scripts article by Peter Ward. I ve generated the SVG from the graphviz source linked in the article.
  2. Technically it has be compatible with Korn shell, but a quick google seems to suggest that that s actually a subset of POSIX shell.
  3. I use oh-my-zsh at $WORK but for now I m going to simplify my personal configuration. If I end up using a lot of plugins I ll reconsider this.
  4. Or if you ve found any typos or other issues that I should fix.

27 December 2023

Bits from Debian: Statement about the EU Cyber Resilience Act

Debian Public Statement about the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the Product Liability Directive The European Union is currently preparing a regulation "on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements" known as the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA). It is currently in the final "trilogue" phase of the legislative process. The act includes a set of essential cybersecurity and vulnerability handling requirements for manufacturers. It will require products to be accompanied by information and instructions to the user. Manufacturers will need to perform risk assessments and produce technical documentation and, for critical components, have third-party audits conducted. Discovered security issues will have to be reported to European authorities within 25 hours (1). The CRA will be followed up by the Product Liability Directive (PLD) which will introduce compulsory liability for software. While a lot of these regulations seem reasonable, the Debian project believes that there are grave problems for Free Software projects attached to them. Therefore, the Debian project issues the following statement:
  1. Free Software has always been a gift, freely given to society, to take and to use as seen fit, for whatever purpose. Free Software has proven to be an asset in our digital age and the proposed EU Cyber Resilience Act is going to be detrimental to it. a. As the Debian Social Contract states, our goal is "make the best system we can, so that free works will be widely distributed and used." Imposing requirements such as those proposed in the act makes it legally perilous for others to redistribute our work and endangers our commitment to "provide an integrated system of high-quality materials with no legal restrictions that would prevent such uses of the system". (2) b. Knowing whether software is commercial or not isn't feasible, neither in Debian nor in most free software projects - we don't track people's employment status or history, nor do we check who finances upstream projects (the original projects that we integrate in our operating system). c. If upstream projects stop making available their code for fear of being in the scope of CRA and its financial consequences, system security will actually get worse rather than better. d. Having to get legal advice before giving a gift to society will discourage many developers, especially those without a company or other organisation supporting them.
  2. Debian is well known for its security track record through practices of responsible disclosure and coordination with upstream developers and other Free Software projects. We aim to live up to the commitment made in the Debian Social Contract: "We will not hide problems." (3) a.The Free Software community has developed a fine-tuned, tried-and-tested system of responsible disclosure in case of security issues which will be overturned by the mandatory reporting to European authorities within 24 hours (Art. 11 CRA). b. Debian spends a lot of volunteering time on security issues, provides quick security updates and works closely together with upstream projects and in coordination with other vendors. To protect its users, Debian regularly participates in limited embargos to coordinate fixes to security issues so that all other major Linux distributions can also have a complete fix when the vulnerability is disclosed. c. Security issue tracking and remediation is intentionally decentralized and distributed. The reporting of security issues to ENISA and the intended propagation to other authorities and national administrations would collect all software vulnerabilities in one place. This greatly increases the risk of leaking information about vulnerabilities to threat actors, representing a threat for all the users around the world, including European citizens. d. Activists use Debian (e.g. through derivatives such as Tails), among other reasons, to protect themselves from authoritarian governments; handing threat actors exploits they can use for oppression is against what Debian stands for. e. Developers and companies will downplay security issues because a "security" issue now comes with legal implications. Less clarity on what is truly a security issue will hurt users by leaving them vulnerable.
  3. While proprietary software is developed behind closed doors, Free Software development is done in the open, transparent for everyone. To retain parity with proprietary software the open development process needs to be entirely exempt from CRA requirements, just as the development of software in private is. A "making available on the market" can only be considered after development is finished and the software is released.
  4. Even if only "commercial activities" are in the scope of CRA, the Free Software community - and as a consequence, everybody - will lose a lot of small projects. CRA will force many small enterprises and most probably all self employed developers out of business because they simply cannot fulfill the requirements imposed by CRA. Debian and other Linux distributions depend on their work. If accepted as it is, CRA will undermine not only an established community but also a thriving market. CRA needs an exemption for small businesses and, at the very least, solo-entrepreneurs.
Information about the voting process: Debian uses the Condorcet method for voting. Simplistically, plain Condorcets method can be stated like so : "Consider all possible two-way races between candidates. The Condorcet winner, if there is one, is the one candidate who can beat each other candidate in a two-way race with that candidate." The problem is that in complex elections, there may well be a circular relationship in which A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A. Most of the variations on Condorcet use various means of resolving the tie. Debian's variation is spelled out in the constitution, specifically, A.5(3) Sources: (1) CRA proposals and links & PLD proposals and links (2) Debian Social Contract No. 2, 3, and 4 (3) Debian Constitution

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